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1 Introduction
The adverse impacts of ambient pollution and its associated costs have received substantial public
policy attention in the last few decades. Nevertheless, the health and economic consequences of in-
door pollution are often overlooked. This is surprising given that the population in developed countries
spends approximately 90% of their time indoors (Klepeis et al., 2001), and the documented substantial
health implications from exposure to indoor pollution. More specifically, the World Health Organi-
sation (WHO) estimates that indoor pollution is responsible for 2.7% of the global burden of disease
and 3.8 million deaths every year. Importantly, indoor pollution is not simply a by-product of ambient
pollution as there are numerous indoor sources of pollution including cooking, smoking and substances
of natural origin such as radon. In fact, indoor levels of pollution are in many cases higher than those
outdoors. As such, focusing on reducing ambient pollution concentrations without addressing indoor
sources would fail to provide adequate protection to the public against overall pollution exposure.
Assessing the economic effects of indoor pollution is challenging even compared to other non-market
goods for several reasons. First, large data samples on indoor air pollution are rarely available. Second,
exposure to indoor pollution may be associated with unobserved factors that are also correlated with
human health and well-being (e.g. income, diet and smoking). Finally, monetizing the total cost of
exposure to indoor pollution is remarkably difficult, as exposure can lead to a wide range of observed
or unobserved health and wellbeing costs.1 This paper exploits a unique opportunity to overcome
these challenges to examine the costs of indoor air pollution. We accomplish this by looking at how
exogenous variation in the level of indoor pollution risk, reported by governmental sources, is linked
with variation in residential property prices in England.
We focus on radon, an odourless, colourless and tasteless indoor air pollutant which is formed by
the natural decay of uranium from rocks and soil. Radon is considered to be the largest source of
exposure to natural ionising radiation which damages human lungs and can even lead to lung cancer
if inhaled and absorbed by nearby tissues. Globally, exposure to radon at homes and workplaces is
estimated to cause tens of thousands of deaths each year, making it the most important cause of lung
cancer after smoking (WHO, 2009; US-EPA, 2013). The main risk factors for getting lung cancer from
radon depends on the level and duration of exposure and whether the individual is a smoker or has
smoked in the past. However, it is important to note that while smoking is an important risk factor,
exposure to radon is also the number one cause of lung cancer among non-smokers. Due to these
deleterious effects on health, radon exposure is an increasingly important environmental concern for
1Indoor pollution can affect a wide range of outcomes including mortality, morbidity, cognitive performance and
educational outcomes (Duflo et al., 2008; Künn et al., 2019; Stafford, 2015; Gilraine, 2019; Roth, 2019).
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policymakers. Consequently, the US, EU and China have developed new radon policies for buildings
and residents, and in many cases have commissioned radon maps of increasing accuracy and spatial
granularity to increase awareness about this issue (Gruber et al., 2013; US-EPA, 2013; Zielinski et al.,
2006). Nonetheless, there is very limited evidence on how effective those policies are in informing
market participants about radon risk and more generally about the economic cost of radon.
We conduct our analysis using a unique data set that combines information on the universe of res-
idential property transactions in England with detailed maps of radon risk provided by Public Health
England that classifies radon risk into six categories of increasing risk, of which all but the first are
classified as ”radon affected areas”.2 To overcome endogeneity concerns, we exploit quasi-experimental
radon risk variation resulting from the publication of an updated radon risk map in England in 2007,
which did not incorporate changes in actual levels of radon, but simply new developments in risk mod-
elling techniques. Our setting is also advantageous because since 2002 the UK standard conveyancing
searches undertaken on behalf of house buyers must include information about radon risk based on
the latest map.3 The combination of arguably exogenous variation and information disclosure to home
buyers provides us with a unique opportunity to estimate the effects of radon risk information in hous-
ing markets.
Our baseline specifications examine the effect of radon risk category changes on home prices using
a repeat-sales approach. The principal measure of radon we use is the reclassification to and from the
first category, i.e. reclassification into and out of a ”radon affected area”. We find a highly significant
negative relationship between changes in radon risk and changes in residential property prices. The
results suggest that an upward reclassification of a property (from being in a radon risk-free category
to being in a radon affected category) reduces property prices by between 1.3 and 1.6 %, depending
on the granularity of the spatial fixed-effects we adopt. These results are economically significant
and are similar to the estimated effects found in studies that measure the impact of energy efficiency
ratings, flooding risk or earthquake risk on property prices (Fuerst et al., 2015; Bosker et al., 2018;
Naoi et al., 2009). In contrast, we find no evidence that downwards reclassifications of radon risk (i.e.
lower radon risk) affect house prices. We posit that this asymmetry is driven by the fact that the
2The six categories of risk are based on the estimated percentage of houses in the grid square above the action level
of 200 becquerels per cubic meter (Bq m3): 0-1% (risk free area), 1-3%, 3-5%, 5-10%, 10-30% and >30%.
3These conveyancing searches include enquiries that are sent to Local Authorities, which are the main units of local
government in the UK. The searches are required to obtain a mortgage. They are not required for cash buyers but
will usually be undertaken. As a robustness test, we confirm that our main analysis yields similar results when using
a subsample of properties with only mortgage buyers. One part of the searches is the CON29 form: a standard set of
questions set by the government, the Law Society and the Local Government Association. CON29 contains required
and optional questions. Radon gas is on the required part, whereas flooding is on the optional part. The radon question
asks if the property is in a ”radon affected area”, which is defined as any risk category higher than category one. There
is no explicit requirement to report the specific category in which the property is although the solicitor can find this out
from other sources.
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buyers are responsible for conducting the conveyancing search (which includes information about the
current radon risk level) and that sellers might not be fully aware of the latest radon risk classification
in their area.
We next show that an increase in the radon risk level increases the number of transactions and test
whether radon risk changes induce sorting. We find that it does, and more specifically we show that
the share of higher educated, higher income and higher social status residents decreases in response to
upward radon risk reclassification. Once again, we find no effect of downward reclassification. These
findings have two important implications. First, they suggests that radon risk disproportionately af-
fects lower socio-economic groups in our society, creating a source of environmental injustice. Second,
it means that our previous estimates are ”local”, in the sense that they reveal the Willingness To
Pay (WTP) of the specific buyers who are purchasing houses affected by radon and not the average
buyer (see Greenstone (2017) for more details). Therefore, we propose and apply a new theoretical
framework that uses transaction probabilities to account for sorting in order to calculate the average
WTP. We also present several robustness tests and placebo exercises to provide further support to our
empirical analysis and to validate our estimates.
The hedonic price method has been widely used for valuing environmental amenities, including the
welfare impacts of cleanups of hazardous waste (Greenstone and Gallagher, 2008), and the capital-
ization of ambient air pollution (Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Currie et al., 2015). However, to the
best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to estimate the economic impact of indoor air pollution.
Surprisingly, even though radon is linked with significant health risks by the epidemiological literature,
it has not yet received much attention in economics and our paper addresses this gap.4
We believe that our study contributes to the existing hedonic literature on air pollution in two
additional ways. First, the institutional set up we study determines that information on property-level
radon risk is made available to buyers through standard conveyancing searches. This addresses an
important concern regarding prior research studying the impact of air pollution on property prices
which are less certain whether market participants are aware of pollution levels. Recent evidence on
the effects of environmental information disclosure on house prices and other outcomes suggests this
is a non-negligible concern (e.g Pope, 2008; Moulton et al., 2018). Second, we propose and utilise a
new theoretical framework to estimate the average willingness to pay in the presence of sorting.
4The only exception is a paper by Smith and Johnson (1988) which studied how households form risk perceptions
using a survey of households’ responses to information about risks associated with radon in Maine (US).
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Importantly, our paper serves to demonstrate that the stakes are high for policymakers working on
indoor air pollution. Due to its geology, the UK has relatively low levels of radon when compared to
those found in other countries, notably US and China. Despite this, our estimates imply that if unmit-
igated by remedial measures the presence of radon in our setting would reduce the total market value
of residential properties in England and Wales by as much as £23 billion.5 Consistent with approaches
in other countries and other domestic policies (e.g. on energy efficiency - Fuerst et al. (2015)), the
UK government radon policy centres on increasing information availability to allow markets to price
environmental risks. As such, our paper provides critical insights into how the market responds to this
information, complementing a growing literature on the effects of access to pollution information (Cut-
ter and Neidell, 2009; Zivin and Neidell, 2009; Barwick et al., 2019) that has so far solely focused on
ambient pollution, and to the empirical literature on the role of information in consumer choices more
broadly (Hastings and Weinstein, 2008; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014; Wichman, 2017). Finally, our work
also speaks to the literature on environmental justice, which denotes various channels through which
environmental costs and poverty or race may be correlated, including household sorting (or ”coming
to the noise”) and selective siting of polluting facilities (Banzhaf et al., 2019; Hausman and Stolper,
2020). The evidence on the extent to which sorting drive the observed correlations in this literature
are mixed, in part reflecting considerable empirical challenges (Banzhaf et al., 2019). We contribute
to this literature by showing that different socio-economic groups sort in response to radon risk change.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section provides background information
about radon risk and risk information policy in the UK; section 3 presents the data and our study
design; section 4 discusses the empirical strategy; section 5 presents the main results of our analysis;
section 6 proposes and utilises a new theoretical framework to account for sorting and estimate the
average WTP, while section 7 concludes.
2 Background on radon and the UK
2.1 Background on radon
Radon is a colourless, odourless and tasteless gas which is formed by the natural decay of uranium
that occurs in all rocks and soil. Once escaped from the ground into the air, it decays and produces
radioactive particles which tend to concentrate in enclosed spaces. The amount of radon in homes,
schools and workplaces depends on a variety of factors including the amount of uranium in the un-
5This range is obtained by multiplying the average impact of being reclassified to a radon affected area (1.33%) by
the number and value of all affected houses in the housing stock.
5
derlying rocks and soil, the available routes for radon to enter the building, and the rate of exchange
between indoor and outdoor air (WHO, 2009). Radon is usually measured in becquerels per cubic
meter (Bq m3) or in picocuries per liter (pCi/L). In the UK and in many other countries, a radon level
of 200 (Bq m3) or above is classified as ”Action Level”, which means that householders are advised
to take actions to reduce radon through remediation works (e.g. by installing a radon sump). The
average radon level in UK homes is 20 (Bq m3), but there is significant variation across geographical
areas and some dwellings have yielded readings of more than ten thousand Bq m3 (PHE, 2018).
According to the medical literature, radon can affect the human body as radioactive elements are
inhaled and enter the lungs where they emit radiation. This radiation (mainly alpha particles) is
absorbed by nearby tissues which can lead to lung cancer. Early epidemiological studies evaluated this
link empirically among miners, and established that exposure to high levels of radon is associated with
an increased risk of lung cancer (Radford and Renard, 1984; Howe et al., 1986; Tirmarche et al., 1993).
Later studies have examined the relationship between residential exposure to radon and lung cancer in
the general population. This strand of the literature, which relies on pooled large scale epidemiological
studies, provides robust evidence that residential exposure to radon is linked with a significant number
of lung cancers in China, North America and Europe (Lubin et al., 2004; Krewski et al., 2005; Darby
et al., 2006). While there is a small theoretical risk that radon exposure can also cause cancer to other
organs, there is currently no strong empirical evidence to support this hypothesis (AGIR, 2009).
Approximately 1,100 lung cancer deaths a year in the UK and 21,000 in the US are attributed to
exposure to elevated levels of radon, making it the most important cause of lung cancer after smoking
(US-EPA, 2013; Gray et al., 2009). The main risk factors for getting lung cancer from radon depends
on the levels of radon exposure and whether the individual is a smoker or has smoked in the past.
For example, if 1,000 people who smoke were exposed to radon level of 10 (pCi/L) over a life time,
about 150 of them could get cancer compared to 36 people among a group of 1,000 people who have
never smoked and were exposed to the same level of radon. Nevertheless, it is important to clarify that
non-smokers are still at significant risk from radon exposure and according to the US Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), radon is the number one cause of lung cancer among non-smokers as well.
There are several methods for radon prevention and mitigation at dwellings, such as increasing under-
floor ventilation, installing radon sump systems, and sealing floors and walls. The appropriate remedial
strategy depends on several factors including radon levels, sources and the type of floor. Importantly,
none of the techniques can guarantee complete eradication of radon and sometimes a combination of
strategies is required to reduce the risk. This is important given the fact that measuring radon con-
centration is a complex process as readings can vary between rooms, over times of day, months of the
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year or even with phases of the moon. Costs of these remedial techniques vary significantly, but as a
rough guideline, approximate costs range between £200 and £2000 according to Public Health England.
2.2 History of radon information and policy in the UK
Developments in understanding the health risks of ionizing radiation after the Second World War led
to investigations of radon levels in UK homes in the 1970s and 1980s. These initial local measurement
schemes developed into a systematic measurement programme which tried to identify areas and houses
exposed to the risk. The concept of ”radon affected areas” was introduced in 1990s and defined as
areas where 1% of houses were above a pre-specified action level. In 1993 several parts of the UK were
designated as affected areas and in 1996 the first complete nation-wide map of radon was published.
The map was based on over 250,000 measurements and denoted radon risk in 5km grid squares using
five categories of risk based on the percentage of houses in the grid above the action level: 0-1% (risk
free area), 1-3%, 3-10%,10-30% and >30%. The measurements in each dwelling were made with two
detectors over a period of three months and were calculated using temperature corrections to enable
to produce accurate annual estimates.6
A second radon map was issued in November 2002 and was in use from 2003. This map (the ”2003
map”) updated the 1996 map based on additional measurements (over 400,000) in the affected regions
and updated probability models. It also included an additional risk category, as the 3-10% category
was split into 3-5% and 5-10%. Additional measurements allowed mapping the affected areas of the
South West of England in a 1km grid. A third iteration of the radon map was then released in late 2007
(the ”2007 map”). This updated map incorporated further improvements to probability models, which
now included not only measurements but also geological information as input variables. Importantly,
two versions of this 2007 map were created from the same underlying data. The first (the ”50m 2007
map”) was a map using a 50m grid for the whole of England and Wales. Unlike the earlier maps,
this version was not available to the public or to local government organisations free of charge, but
required a fee to be accessed (a paid subscription for institutions including government organisations).
However, a second publicly available version of the 2007 update was released which indicated radon
risk in 1km grid squares (the ”1km 2007 map”). This 1km map was created by taking the maximum
category of radon risk in all the 50m squares within each 1km square.
Radon information can be obtained by individuals in two main ways. First, the maps are available
6Houses included in the measurement program were selected based on progressive measurements of areas where initial
reading were high and geological data.
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online for download, so potential buyers could in theory find this information themselves. However,
since it is unlikely that the average buyer would actively search for such information online, we believe
(and later document) that the main source of radon information that buyers received is the set of
questions submitted to Local Authorities (LAs) by solicitors and licensed conveyancers on behalf of
their clients when a property is traded or a development application is made.7 These are know as
Local Authority searches and the specific form used to make enquiries is known as CON29. CON29
contains a standard set of questions which are jointly agreed by the government and the Law Society.
Part of the form indicates required questions (CON29r) and another part contains optional questions
(CON29o). Information about radon has been a part of this process since 1994 and it was made
compulsory in July 2002 (it was previously optional). Obtaining a CON29 is a standard part of the
transaction process and a formal requirement when making a mortgage application. The information
about radon is based on risk categories, but the CON29 is only strictly required to state if a property
is in a radon affected area (any category other than category 1) and not its actual risk category.
The transmission of information contained in the radon maps to home buyers is an important
consideration in our empirical work. In late 2002 copies of the 2003 map were provided to all Lo-
cal Authorities (LAs) in the country, and contemporaneous guidance issued by the National Radon
Protection Board (NRPB) indicated that the map should be used by LAs to answer enquiries by
conveyancers about whether homes were in radon affected areas. For the 2007 map update, things
are more complicated as Local Authorities had a choice about which map to use. Around half of the
Local Authorities in the country have elected to licence the more spatially detailed 50m version of the
map for some or all the period since it was released, while the other half have elected to use the freely
available 1km version of the 2007 map. In our later empirical work we will define home level radon
information based on the version of the 2007 map the associated LA had at the time of the home sale,
and further exploit the two map versions for robustness checks.8
7Local Authorities are the main unit of local government in the UK.
8Besides the radon maps and the CON29 form, there are two further institutional details which are somewhat related.
First, newly built houses are subject to radon policies. The general policy since 1990 has been that houses with radon
levels above 200 Bq m-3 are advised to apply preventive measures and all new buildings in affected areas have to apply
these measures (National Radiological Protection Board, NRPB (1996)). Second, a Home Information Packs (HIP)
policy, in place from late 2007 to May 2010, required home sellers or their representatives to disclose a number of
documents and pieces of information to buyers about the home before a sale: an Energy Performance Certificate, local
authority searches, title documents, guarantees, etc, as well as to state if the home is in a ”Radon Affected Area”
as identified by the Health Protection Agency”.While the HIP policy could signal a mechanism for sellers to learn of
radon risk changes to their home, in practice this assumption could be tenuous as it would require that (a) the HIP
contains accurate and up to date radon information from a new LA radon search, and (b) the seller carefully checking
the HIP radon question. The first condition is undermined because the regulations do not specify which map should be
used, and by evidence from a local survey that found five out of six HIPs contained “inaccurate, incomplete or missing
information” (”Home Information Packs: a short history”, House of Commons Research Paper 10/69). The second also
seems improbable given that the vast majority of sellers would be unaware of the 2007 radon map update (or even
that radon maps are periodically updated), and hence unlikely to carefully check through a 100 page document for this
information.
8
3 Data and Study Design
Our final dataset combines information on house sales, radon risk and various socioeconomic char-
acteristics from several administrative sources. Data on house sales come from the Land Registry,
which contains all housing transactions in England between the years 1995-2018. From this source,
we take over 2.4 million transactions that took place during our 2003-2011 study period. This is the
population of all repeated transactions of the same property which is a sub-sample of the population
of all 6.48 million transactions in England in this period. Our data on radon risk comes from radon
maps provided by Public Health England (PHE) which are the publicly available maps and the 50m
map provided by the British Geological Survey. The public maps are presented in Figure 1. Notably,
the three maps include revisions of the radon level in numerous locations with the vast majority of
revisions increasing the level of radon risk (see Table 1).
In order to focus our study on areas where we can be certain that buyers received information
about radon and what map was used to provide it, we only consider transactions in which the first
sale occurred between 2003-2007 and the second sale between 2008-2011.9 The full database consists
of 1.4m pairs of transactions, as shown in Table 1.
There are 6 radon categories in each map and home level changes can theoretically be in any of the
36 possible combinations. However, as shown in Table 1, in practice more than 91% of homes in our
sample stay in the same category. Of those that do move categories, more than 7% start in category
1 and move up. Less than 1.5% start in a category higher than 1 and move down one or several
categories. Moreover, some combinations of starting and ending category are very thin, especially
when we condition on area fixed effects. We therefore collapse the dimensionality of this problem by
either (a) focusing on particular start/end category combinations that are well-populated, (b) reclas-
sifying moves into upwards, downwards, or stays the same, or (c) treating the change in categories
as a continuous variable. Each has drawbacks, but in general in our analysis we prefer (a) and (b) to (c).
To create our final dataset, we first geocode each property in our house prices data using the
AddressBase database from the Ordnance Survey. This gives us the exact location of each house,
which enables us to assign a radon risk category to each transaction from the radon risk maps. We
use data on periods where Local Authorities had a subscription to the 50m grid version of the 2007
radon map to ensure the radon risk in our data matches the radon information buyers receive from
9Starting our sample period in 2003 ensures this because this is when radon questions became compulsory in CON29.
We choose to end the sample period in 2011 as this is the last year for which we have rich demographic information
(from the Census).
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CON29. Finally, we merge our geo-referenced data with neighbourhood-level information on socioe-
conomic characteristics such as education, age and ethnicity from the 2001 and 2011 Census to test
for potential sorting.The spatial units we use are Output Area (OA): the smallest census geography in
the UK with an average of around 100 residents. Following the public health department’s method of
aggregation, we measure the OA radon level as the maximum radon risk for any house in the same OA.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for all transactions in our dataset. The first two columns show
that cross-sectionally, transaction prices in radon affected areas do not appear to be statistically dif-
ferent in the full sample, although the mean house price is slightly lower for transactions in categories
higher than one. The next three columns suggest that in the repeated sale sample prices of prop-
erties where radon did not change grew faster than in places where radon risk changed (upwards or
downwards) although the differences are not statistically significant. Naturally, these comparisons are
very general as they do not account for confounding factors. In the next section we provide detailed
explanation of possible confounders and how our empirical strategy overcomes them.
4 Empirical Strategy
Following the standard hedonic approach to modelling house prices, we begin with the following simple
equation:
ln(Pit) = βRit + ρXik + ǫit (1)
Where Pit denotes the transaction price of property i in period (year) t, Rit is the level of radon for
the transacted property given by the grid used by the Local Authority at the time of the transaction,
Xik is a vector of time invariant property characteristics, and ǫ is an idiosyncratic error term.
The usual identification problem is that radon levels can be correlated with both the features of
the house and with property price. For example, geological conditions could affect the level of radon
but also the amenity value of the location or construction materials used to build houses. As such,
estimating equation 1 would yield a biased estimate in the presence of unobserved correlated factors.
To overcome this problem we take advantage of the popular approach in the real estate literature
and adopt a repeat-sales approach (Cannaday et al., 2005). More specifically, if the same property is






= ln(Piτ )− ln(Pit) = β∆Riτt + ǫiτt (2)
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The repeated sale approach removes all time-invariant characteristics and focuses our identification
on changes in radon risk levels within the same property over time. The approach is particularly
compelling in our context because geological conditions and actual radon levels do not change over
time, yet the estimates of the radon risk do due to map updates. As radon only affects humans through
the impact on their health β captures the impact of the health risk associated with radon on prices.
Since time varying unobserved correlated variables remain a potential threat for causal identification,
we allow for house prices to change over time by including a fixed effect θ for each pair of periods τ






= ln(Piτ )− ln(Pit) = β∆Riτt + θτt + ǫiτt (3)
Furthermore, we also adjust for local housing cycles by allowing each area to have its own trend
in prices. We use two definitions of a local area, one broad and one tight. For the broader units we
use labour market areas, know in the UK as Travel to Work Areas (TTWA), and for the tighter units
we again use micro-neighbourhoods as defined by Census Output Areas (OA).10 Specifically, our main






= ln(Piτ )− ln(Pit) = β∆Riτt + θrτt + ǫiτt (4)
Where θrτt is an interaction term of the area r fixed effect (TTWA or OA) with the time fixed
effect θτt, introduced in equation 3. Therefore, our identification is based on changes in radon risk
levels within the same property over time, accounting for all time varying correlated factors within
areas. Finally, standard errors are cluster-robust in two dimensions, over 1km grid squares and time
periods.
Importantly, for equation 4 to reveal a causal estimate, several identifying assumptions should be
made. First, housing market participants (buyers and sellers) must be aware of the radon risk and take
it into account when making buying and selling decisions. For example, if buyers are unaware of higher
radon risk in a property, they will not ask for a discount and our estimates should be zero. While this
fundamental identification assumption is being made implicitly in all papers that rely on the hedonic
technique, it is not frequently discussed or addressed explicitly.11 We believe that our unique context
enables us to ease concerns regarding a violation of this crucial assumption as buyers receive infor-
mation about radon risk levels when buying properties. More specifically, buyers receive information
10Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs) are geographies used by the UK government to approximate self-contained areas in
which most people live and work. There are 228 TTWAs in the UK according the 2011 Census data).
11There are several exceptions to this, including early work by Kask and Maani (1992). See Pope (2008) for a recent
example of an environmental application that examines the effect of information disclosure.
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on radon risk levels as it is included in the conveyancing process through the local authority search
(CON29), which is based on the same radon risk data that we use in our study. Interestingly, while the
owner will know what the radon risk was at the time of the first transaction, they will not necessarily
be aware of updates to radon risk in their area. Therefore, if new data reveal that the radon risk in an
area is reduced, a rational buyer might not pass this information to the seller and we are not expecting
to see an effect on property prices. In our empirical section we test this prospect empirically.
Second, updates in the maps have to be exogenous to other determinants of house prices. To vali-
date this assumption we start by demonstrating that the main treatment in our analysis (radon level
going from ”risk free” to ”radon affected”) is uncorrelated to observable variables in balancing tests in
Table 3. Specifically, we show that assignment of the treatment was not related to characteristics of
local populations. Regressing shares of the local population with different characteristics (taken from
the 2001 Census) on an indicator for radon level going from ”risk free” to ”radon affected” shows that
the treatment did not occur in locations that are different in terms of residents’ characteristics from the
rest of the sample.12 Furthermore, we test whether radon risk is correlated with ambient air pollution
which has been shown to affect house prices in numerous studies (e.g. Chay and Greenstone (2005))
and can therefore pose a risk for causal interpretation. More specifically, we examine the correlation
of OA level ambient air pollution measured by PM10 and OA level radon risk.13 In Table A1 columns
(1) and (2) we regress levels of the PM10 index on levels of radon risk in 2003 and 2008 with MSOA
fixed effects. Column (3) repeats this for changes in both measures of air pollution at OA level. All
results indicate that ambient air pollution is not correlated with either levels or changes in radon risk.
Importantly, note that since we use a first difference approach, our estimates would only be biased if
the treatment was correlated to changes in other determinants of house prices. Later in the paper we
test for the presence of such bias with placebo tests using periods in which there were no changes in
radon maps and find no evidence of trends correlated to our treatment.
Third, in order to claim that the estimated effect is the price households attach to air pollution
risk, we have to measure changes in air pollution risk observed by households. One possible concern
is that radon remedial measures may introduce an misalignment between the level of risk observed in
our data and by buyers, since we cannot observe if properties have remedial measures in place. For
12The only exception is education, as the treated areas are likely to have fewer university graduates than non-treated
locations. Since the coefficient is small and it is the only variable in a group of 22 that is statistically significant, there
is little evidence that the treatment is correlated to observed determinants of house prices which suggests no correlation
with unobserved determinants.
13The information on ambient air pollution (PM10) comes from the Department for Environment Food and Rural
Affairs (DEFRA). To generate PM10 measures we keep stations that have less than 10% missing values for these years
and we assign pollution level to OA by linking it with the three closest monitoring stations to each OA centroid. We
then use the mean value of those three measurements weighted by the inverse squared distance between the monitoring
station and the OA centroid.
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example, a change in the level of risk which in our data is between categories 2 and 6 could be less
consequential for the buyer if the house is equipped with radon mitigation devices. Mindful of this
issue, in our main results we focus on properties for which the first transaction occurred when the
contemporary map indicated no risk of radon. These houses had no, or at least very low-powered,
incentives to install radon mitigation devices before the update of the map. Another possible source of
measurement error is that owners can measure the actual level of radon in their houses and may thus
have different information than reflected on the map. For example, if the seller tests the house that
has been reclassified into a high risk area and the test shows no pollution, our measure of risk would
be biased. We will address this concern in Section 5.3.
Finally, it is important to note that a hedonic model only reveals the marginal willingness to pay
(WTP) of the marginal buyer. This means that in order to interpret our ”direct” hedonic estimates
as the average WTP of the population we would have to make a number of assumptions, including
that there is no sorting based on radon (Greenstone, 2017; Ekeland et al., 2002). In the next sections
we will test this assumption directly and in Section 6 we will propose and apply a new theoretical
framework to estimate this policy relevant parameter in a context with sorting.
5 Results
5.1 Main Results
We begin our empirical investigation by examining whether upwards and downwards movements in
home level radon risk categories affect property prices.14 Recall that radon category 1 is denoted as a
”radon risk free area” in the local authority search (CON29), whereas all other categories are denoted
as being in ”an area that is affected by radon”. Commensurate with the institutional set up, we first
examine in Table 4 whether moving to and from category 1 affects house prices. In this table we
partial out broad labour market-wide trends in prices by interacting sales years with labour-market
area (TTWA) dummies.
In panel A, we test for upwards risk moves, using samples composed of sales that stay in category
1 (the baseline category), and homes that move from category 1 to other, by definition higher, cate-
gories. In column 1, we examine moves from category 1 (risk free) to the lowest category classified as
affected by radon (category 2). Despite the relatively small increase in radon risk between categories
14For clarity of exposition we present upwards and downwards changes in separate regressions but collapsing them
into a single regression yields almost identical results.
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1 and 2, this upward risk classification decreases house prices by some 1.64%. In columns (2)-(5) we
progressively expand the sample to include homes that start in category 1 but move to higher risk
categories. In all cases the parameter estimates are slightly smaller in magnitude but statistically
indistinguishable from our estimate in column 1.15 Nonetheless, our best estimate of the total average
impact of radon on prices of affected houses is the 1.33% discount from column (5).
Given that the updating of the maps led to reclassifications of properties downwards as well as
upwards, we test downwards moves in panel B of Table 4. Our identification of the downwards moves
is based on a sample of homes that stay in a given category or in category 1 (our baseline category),
and homes that move from the given category to category 1. We obtain small negative coefficients
that are not significantly different from zero throughout. These results suggest that conditional on
labour market trends in prices, a home reclassified from a radon affected area to not being in a radon
affected area does not command a statistically significant price premium.
This suggests an asymmetry in price responses to radon risk which is consistent with buyers and
sellers acting on information about higher radon risk but not acting on information about lower radon
risk. One possible explanation for this is the asymmetry in radon information between buyers and
sellers. As mentioned above, buyers receive radon risk information from conveyancing searches, but
sellers will not necessarily be fully aware of the latest radon risk classification in their area. Hence, with
information mostly coming from the buyer-side, only upwards movements in radon risk classification
get priced in.
In table 5, we attempt to exclude as many confounders as possible by using the tighter geographical
fixed-effects available in the data (Output Area), which means that identification is based on compar-
ing homes in the same micro locations. More specifically, we interact Output Area indicators with
years of sale to focus on houses selling in the same pair of years and the same area. These specifications
control for changes in local amenities such as school quality, public transport or ambient air pollution
but also for changes in the composition of the neighbourhood (i.e. sorting), which helps identify the
direct impact of map changes on the affected houses (Ekeland et al., 2002). Reassuringly, the estimated
coefficients remain highly significant and similar to the findings in Table 4. Again, we find that upward
changes in risk significantly affect house prices, but downward changes do not. However, the effect
of upwards risk reclassification are slightly higher than those estimated conditional on labour-market
trends, but they are also less precisely estimated given the natural reduction in the sample size when
15As we discuss further below, it may be that the smaller magnitude of the coefficients when we add higher risk
categories follows from unobserved radon remedial works in higher risk category homes. In many later regressions we
will focus solely on homes that move from category 1 to category 2 for this reason.
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using such restrictive fixed-effects.
Using the results discussed above and the cumulative risks of lung cancer at different radon con-
centrations (category levels) by smoking status,16 we can test whether house price responses to radon
risk information updates are consistent with monetised changes in lung cancer risk. We first calculate
the implied monetary values of lung cancer risk in each risk category using a value of a statistical life
of £5 million,17 and official estimates of smoking prevalence by the UK Office of National Statistics
(ONS).18 Based on the above, and by assuming an average household size of 2.3, we estimate that
moving from category 1 to category 2 should yield an increase in risk with a present value of between
£800 and £1,400 per household on average. While this is by necessity assumption heavy, our esti-
mated coefficient for moving up from category 1 to category 2 in column 3 panel A of Table 5 implies
a change in house prices of roughly £4,300, which is larger than the implied value of risk. This back
of the envelope calculation suggests that market participants are overreacting to the risk, which would
be consistent with findings in the literature (Sunstein and Zeckhauser, 2011; Dessaint and Matray,
2017). Having said that, there is considerable uncertainty about the appropriate VSL here, and in any
case we cannot rule out a rational valuation of risk since the 95% confidence interval for our central
estimate puts the change in house prices in the range £1,212 to £7,479.
Results so far have been based on movements from and to category 1 radon risk. In Table 6 we
examine the effect of upwards and downwards movements in house level radon risk more generally. In
column (1)-(3) we estimate the effect of moving up and down 1 or more categories from different start-
ing categories conditional on labour-market price trends. In column (1) we retain houses that start in
category 1, in column (2) we examine the average effect of going up or down one or more categories
from categories 2 and 3, and in column (3) for houses that start initially in categories 4,5 and 6. We
find that going up and down risk categories from categories 2 and 3 both yield price reductions, but
the coefficients are smaller than in column (1) and not significant at any conventional level. In column
(3) we find that the same result for going up and down categories when a house starts in categories
4,5 and 6. In columns (4)-(6) we repeat the analysis, but using only houses where risk categories stay
the same or go up or down by 1 category (i.e. we drop houses that move more than one category).
This yields similar coefficients to those obtained in columns (1) and (3), but the discount attracted
16The source for this is Table 4.3 of the Health Protection Agency report ”Radon and Public Health: Report of
the independent Advisory Group on Ionising Radiation” https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/335102/RCE-11_for_website.pdf.
17The choice of this VSL is of course arbitrary but this value is within the typical range used in the US.
18According to the UK Office of National Statistics, 14.7% of people aged 18 years and above are smokers.
For more details see the following: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/
healthandlifeexpectancies/bulletins/adultsmokinghabitsingreatbritain/2018. On the basis that adults represent
70% of the population, we assume that approximately 10% of the population smoke.
15
by going down risk category from categories 2 and 3 is now statistically significant and comparable to
our estimate in column (2).
In Table 7 we use a balanced panel of Output Areas with two periods (we collapsed years between
2003 and 2011 into periods before and after the 2007 map is issued) to test whether an increase in
radon risk affects the number of housing transactions. In column (1) we show a positive correlation
between the number of transactions and changes in radon. In columns (2)-(4) we estimate the effect of
changes in radon risk corresponding to our earlier specifications. Similar to our house price analysis,
we find that the effect is not symmetric, an increase in the radon risk level at the OA level increases
the number of transactions in that area, but a reduction in the risk does not significantly affect the
number of transactions. In column (5) we test the impact of changes in radon levels on the average
transaction price in the OA, using all rather than just repeated sale transactions. Reassuringly, the
results are consistent with our earlier estimates.
To summarise, in this section we find compelling evidence that market participants do react to
house level radon risk information, but that the nature of this reaction is not straightforward. Specifi-
cally, we find large effects on house prices when a house moves from a ”radon free” classification to ”a
radon affected area” classification, but little evidence that movements between other risk categories
affect prices.19 Finally, we find no evidence that going down categories increases prices, which might
be due to sellers being unaware of changes to radon risk categories.
5.2 Sorting
In this section we investigate the possibility that changes in radon risk information may lead to taste-
based sorting of residents across properties and neighbourhood for two main reasons. First, it may
explain all or some of the price changes that we observed above. For example, if an upward change in
radon risk level attracts less wealthy individuals, we might expect to see a drop in property prices in
response to this compositional change to the extent in which living near wealthy individuals is more
attractive (Ioannides and Zabel, 2003; Topa and Zenou, 2015; Kling et al., 2007). Although, our re-
duced from results adjust for neighbourhood composition using OA trends, it is unclear whether these
estimates can be classified as the average willingness to pay to avoid radon of the average buyer, since
19One possible explanation for the lack of evidence for high risk categories could be that houses in these higher risk
categories have undertaken radon remedial works, such as installing a radon sump, so that actual radon risk is lower
than what we observe in our data. Although we lack data on house level remedial measures, Public Health England
releases information on the number of house radon tests conducted in each postcode sector, which should be a good
predictor of remedial measures. In table 9 we exclude postcode areas where PHE reports that the number of house
radon tests is greater than 1% of the number of address points. Reassuringly, coefficients are similar to, and statistically
indistinguishable from our main results.
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it requires the strict assumption that buyers do not sort based on radon (Greenstone, 2017). Second,
testing for sorting might also help us to shed light on issues of environmental justice (e.g. Banzhaf
et al., 2019; Hausman and Stolper, 2020).
In Table 8 we test whether residents sort in response to changes in radon risk using census data
by regressing changes in Output Area characteristics between the 2001 and 2011 Census on our main
radon treatment variable (collapsed to the Output Area level), conditional on labour-market (TTWA)
fixed effects. The table shows that the share of people with characteristics normally correlated with
higher house prices, such as being educated, having higher income and social status (Ioannides and
Zabel, 2003; van Ham and Manley, 2009), decreases in response to upward radon risk reclassifica-
tion. Interestingly, the share of owner occupiers falls, which is expected as renters may not receive
information about radon or may be more likely to accept temporary exposure related to short term
tenancy. At the same time, we find that the same Census variables are not statistically correlated with
reclassification downwards to a risk free area at the conventional levels. Overall these findings lead
us to two important conclusions. First, radon risk falls disproportionately on lower socio-economic
groups, as they move into affected areas in search for a price discount: an example of environmental
injustice that results from sorting. Second, we are unable to support the assumption of no sorting
as a consequence of the reclassification, and we therefore interpret our previous estimates as ”local”
in the sense that they reveal the WTP of the specific buyers who are purchasing houses affected by
radon. In other words, it is the market price of indoor air pollution risk in the housing market, under
supply determined by the pre-determined housing stock and the natural experiment, while demand
is determined by preferences of the population. However, since we are also interested in the average
willingness to pay for avoiding radon, in Section 6 we propose and utilise a new theoretical framework
to estimate this policy relevant parameter.
5.3 Robustness and placebo tests
In this section we provide a set of placebo and robustness tests to support the soundness of our em-
pirical analysis. We begin by conducting a placebo test in which we examine the impact of the change
in radon maps introduced in 2007 on transaction pairs in which both first and second sales happen
after 2010. In other words, we apply the change between the 2003 and 2007 radon maps to properties
for which both transactions occurred after 2011. This approach checks for local trends correlated to
changes in radon (including long-term trends induced by sorting). The first four columns in Tables
9 use the placebo treatment and find no effect, demonstrating that our treatment effect cannot be
attributed to a long-term trend that is correlated to changes in radon. This also suggests that the
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sorting effects occur relatively quickly after the maps change.
In the last two columns of Table 9, we assess if our estimates are affected by measurement error,
as previously discussed in Section 4. To address this issue, we take advantage of the fact that the
majority of home radon measurements in the UK are recorded by PHE (the government agency which
subsidises radon measurements). Our strategy is to replicate our results but restricting attention only
to areas where fewer than 1% of houses have had measurements taken by PHE. Findings in column (5)
control for labour-market trends and in column (6) adopt the more granular OA fixed effects. In both
cases estimates are similar to our baseline results, demonstrating that home radon measurement are
unlikely to be a major source of bias in our estimates. These findings thus provide further reassurance
that our main results are robust to mis-measurement that may arise as a consequence of a dwelling
having an evaluation of radon risk independent of the publicly-available radon maps.
A related problem could arise if a house is purchased with cash rather than a mortgage. Since
cash buyers are not formally required to request an environmental search for their house (CON29),
they may not have information on radon. In this case, it is possible that the buyer would not receive
information about radon risk. To test if this is affecting our results, we use a sub sample of trans-
actions financed by the mortgage provider Nationwide Building Society.20 To check if transactions
with mortgages are different from the rest of the sample, we add a dummy variable denoting having a
mortgage from Nationwide and interact it with the treatment variable. The results presented in Table
A3 in the appendix demonstrate that the sample of houses that have certainly been bought with a
mortgage receives the same treatment effect as the rest of our sample. This shows that our results are
unlikely to be biased by mis-measuring the information that cash buyers receive.
In our final test of robustness we explore the assumption that prices react to radon information
given to buyers by Local Authorities through form CON29. More specifically we leverage that we
know which version of the 2007 radon map - the 50m grid or the 1km grid - is being used by an LA
to provide radon risk information at the time of the second sale, and we run tests to check that is
this information which is indeed driving house price changes. In column 1 of in Table A2, we first
separate out the treatment variable for the two different versions of the map and estimate the effect
for each group. Reassuringly we find that the impact of radon reclassification to ’radon affected’ is the
same regardless of which version of the map is being used to provide this information. In column 2 we
restrict attention to sales where CON29 is based on the 50m grid map and test if a radon treatment
defined using the 1km grid information affects prices. Perhaps surprisingly, it does not. However,
20Data for transactions financed by Nationwide come directly from the lender.
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more reassuringly, when information on radon changes from both 1km and 50m grids is included in
this same regression in column 3, only the latter matters for transactions that have access to it. This
provides further convincing evidence that the effects we estimate stem from information transmitted
in the CON29 form.
6 Theoretical and empirical framework to identify WTP
Given the difficulties in estimating WTP in the presence of sorting, in this section we outline some
well-known challenges in identifying WTP only from changes in market prices, and we propose a new
framework, which uses transaction probabilities, to mitigate these challenges.
6.1 The household
We begin by specifying the household problem using a standard model of housing choice with hetero-
geneous houses and preferences suggested by Bayer et al. (2007). Here, households (q) maximise their
indirect utility (V ) by choosing to live in a house (i) with some characteristics (h), a level of radon
risk (r) which is purchased at a certain price (p). Formally, the household maximisation problem can
be written as follow:
maxV
q







where αh,r,p are household-specific parameters which reflect different household preferences and
budgets that vary with characteristics of households (defined as zq) such as income, race, employment
status, aversion to lung cancer and smoking habits. We express the relationship between the household-
specific parameter of each characteristic of a house or the area denoted by j (where, j ∈ {h, r, p}) as:
α
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This expression shows the preference of household q for characteristic j, which also applies to the
preference for radon risk. The first term of the above equation gives the mean parameter across the
population while the second is the idiosyncratic preference term. Naturally, the empirical challenge
is to estimate α0r, which is the average WTP in the population and therefore the policy relevant





k = 0 which is unlikely to hold in many settings (see Kuminoff and Pope
(2014) for more detail).
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6.2 The housing market
The above household problem can be used to characterize housing demand. The probability that
household q decides to live in house i is a function of characteristics of the household and the house
(including its price and radon risk) and can be written as follow:
P
q
i = fi (z
q, pi, hi, ri) (7)











i = Si and price pi is the market clearing price which
depends on the total amount of houses of type i and the demand for these houses.21 Bayer et al.
(2004) provide a solution to this model showing that this price increases when demand for houses of
this type exceeds supply and decreases in the opposite case.
The corollary of the above is that the effect of radon on the market clearing price is not necessarily
the same as the average WTP. The supply of any one type of houses is fixed so the price of an af-
fected house is determined by matching demand for those houses to the supply. However, the average
household living in a radon affected house can have a different preference for radon than an average
household. If the supply of radon affected houses is high compared to demand, the price discount will
be more than the WTP to avoid radon risk as even households that are more averse to radon than the
average will move into an affected house when the price of that house is low enough. If the supply of
radon affected houses is low compared to demand, the price discount will be less than the WTP. In
this case only those who have the highest WTP for a radon affected house will purchase them. This
process is usually referred to as sorting, a mechanism where households locate in places where their
preference-adjusted utility is maximized (Bayer et al., 2007). Since in our model marginal utility is
zero for all households, sorting is reflected in the idiosyncratic preference for characteristics of a house,
and every house is inhabited by the household with the highest preference for its characteristics. To
illustrate the impact of sorting on the market-clearing price, consider a simple case where character-
istics of potential buyers are endogenous to prices and characteristics of the houses in the housing
stock. When prices decrease, more potential buyers with a preference for low prices enter the market.
When houses are treated with higher radon risk, more buyers with a preference for higher radon risk
houses enter the market. These buyers will end up purchasing the affected dwellings and the observed
21Note that each housing type has its own equilibrium price. For simplicity we focus on modelling the price of a single
type of a house (affected by radon) and ignore the general equilibrium effect on other house types.
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transaction price will be higher than it would be without sorting.
6.3 Identifying WTP
As different households have different preferences, WTP is not observed directly in the data. However,
we develop a strategy that allows us to estimate WTP from the impact of radon on transaction prices
and the number of transactions that occur at those prices. The idea here is that if the transaction
price is the market-clearing price, the probability of a transaction at that price can help us to reveal
the WTP of an average treated owner. The following section explains this empirical strategy in detail.
At the very basic level, a house is sold if the value it delivers to the owner is lower than the value
it delivers to the highest bidder. Both of these values are determined by the same household problem
(outlined above), and the results differ due to different budgets and preferences. Based on the fact that
our treatment is orthogonal to household characteristics of owners, we can assume that the distribution
of preferences of the treated owners is random (reflecting different characteristics of households). At
the same time, the sorting mechanism that we explained above shows that the composition of prefer-
ences of the highest bidders is likely to be endogenous to prices and the corresponding characteristics
of properties in the housing stock. For example, properties affected by radon risk attract buyers with
different characteristics than properties without radon risk. Furthermore, these buyers will face a
different supply and demand conditions than buyers of an unaffected house.
To present a more general analysis we suppress subscripts denoting households and house types
and describe a matching process of an owner and a buyer for a house of a specific type. We denote
the valuation of the owner WO and the valuation of the buyer with the highest willingness to pay for
it (the maximum bidder) WB . We assume that both valuations are random to allow for preferences.
Since the treatment is assigned randomly to the owners, the preference-based idiosyncratic component
of their valuation is expected to be zero on average so that the mean change in the valuation of the
house on the owner side when the house is affected by radon (denoted by R) is simply the WTP
denoted as φ and we can therefore write it as follow:22
WOR = W
O − φ (9)
On the buyer side, the situation is more complicated due to the sorting process and the potential
mismatch of supply and demand for houses of a particular type. We specify this by allowing the buyer’s
22Note that when radon is a binary variable, φ equals α0r from the household problem above.
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valuation to change by an additional factor ϕ, which accounts for this sorting and the mismatch between
supply and demand for affected houses:
WBR = W
B − φ+ ϕ (10)
At this point we are agnostic about the sign of ϕ as the above analysis shows that it could be
positive, negative or zero. It simply allows buyers to be affected in different ways than owners and its
value is an empirical question, which is not the focus of this paper. Importantly, ϕ gives the difference
to the impact of radon on the average owner (not the average seller) which will allows us to identify
the impact of radon on the valuation to the average owner.
The next step is to match owners of the affected houses with the highest bidders for their house.
We assume that the (market clearing) transaction price is generated by a Nash bargaining solution
where 0 < α < 1 gives the fraction of the surplus attributable to the buyer. For transactions that








For the radon affected case:
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Maximizing with respect to price yields:
pR = (1− α)
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Which gives the observed transaction prices of houses affected by radon. In this equation, buyers
are allowed to sort based on their preferences and supply/demand conditions (i.e. they have a different
willingness to pay than the population average of φ). The difference between the owner’s valuation
and the buyer’s valuation is defined as a random variable λ = WB −WO. The difference between the
seller and buyer valuations for a radon affected house is:
λR =
(






= WB −WO − ϕ (14)
This clearly shows that λ only changes due to ϕ. Combining the last two equations gives, for an
affected and unaffected house respectively:
22
pR = (1− α)λR +W
O − φ (15)
p = (1− α)λ+WO (16)
To estimate φ we can write first differences describing the change in the price of a house when it is
re-classified from radon-free to radon-affected house:
pR − p = ∆p = (1− α)(λR − λ) +W
O −WO − φ = (1− α)(λR − λ)− φ (17)
Between the two cases, WO does not change, there is no φ in the case of the unaffected house and
λR − λ = ϕ so the equation simplifies to:
∆p = (1− α)ϕ− φ (18)
Which gives a very intuitive result that the change in price is the WTP plus the impact of sorting
and supply/demand mismatch multiplied by the market power parameter. Furthermore, when sellers
are price takers and α = 1, this is similar to hedonic models and WTP can be calculated from changes
in market prices.
Note that ∆p is already estimated to be - £3,375 (from column (5) table 5) so φ can be calculated
if ϕ and α are known. First, we set α to be 59.3% based on Besley et al. (2014), who estimated
this parameter using the same data. Second, we note that ϕ can be calculated from probabilities of
transactions with an identifying assumption that λ and λR have the same distribution denoted by
G(.). For simplicity (and following Besley et al. (2014)), we assume that G(.) is a normal distribution.
A transaction occurs only when the buyer’s valuation exceeds the owner’s valuation and the likelihood






If both valuations are affected by radon in the same way, this probability does not change (λ
does not change so T remains unchanged). However, if radon affects valuations of owners and buyers
differently, the probability of a transaction can change. Therefore, the probability of a transaction of










Where the second term gives the change in the probability due to being affected by sorting on
preferences for radon, as shown in Figure 2.
From this we know T = 2.48%23 and TR − T = 0.03%
24. To solve for ϕ we follow Besley et al.
(2014) and assume that G(.) is normal with σ = 7082. This allows us to calculate E(λ) for unaffected
properties at -£13,904, ϕ =£36 and φ =£3,360. Converting φ into a percentage value of the price
of an unaffected property gives 1.66% which is our estimate of the average WTP. From this we con-
clude that the impact of sorting is very small and the hedonic estimate is very close to the average WTP.
7 Conclusion
We provide the first empirical evidence on the economic effects of indoor air pollution. By focusing
on radon and the housing market, we are able to address many of the key challenges in the existing
air pollution literature and provide compelling evidence that market participants react to information
about indoor air pollution related to radon. Our results show that prices of houses affected by exoge-
nous increases in radon risk decrease significantly. Our preferred specifications place the magnitude
of the estimate in the range of 1.3% to 1.7%. This is larger but broadly in line with the effect which
would be expected from a rational response to the health risk posed by radon (based on the value of
a statistical life). We also find that changes in radon risk cause sorting and corresponding changes in
characteristics of residents of the affected areas. Specifically, we show that residents from higher SEGs
move out of places that are newly affected by radon, and that people from lower SEGs move in. These
results thus highlight how sorting leads to the disproportionate exposure of lower SEGs to indoor air
pollution. Although beyond the scope of our paper, we note that this environmental injustice may be
exacerbated if individuals in these SEGs are less able to adopt radon remedial measures, for example
because of credit or informational constraints.25
Our results prove to be robust to multiple tests, but they are still limited by the institutional setting
and data availability. Most notably, while we find no evidence that reclassifying a house from a radon
affected to a radon free category increases prices, we are unable to conclusively determine whether this
is due to sellers being unaware of changes to radon levels (unlike the buyers), or due to small sample
23Estimated as the number of transactions per quarter: 3.094548 over the population of houses in the OA in 2011:
125.
24Estimated as Tp = 2.48% multiplied by one plus the change in transaction numbers reported in Table 7 of 1.14%
giving Tpr = 2.51%.
25This seems plausible because surveys suggest the main reason for households not remediating radon is cost. See
Appendix D of the report of the Independent Advisory Group on Ionising Radiation https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/335102/RCE-11_for_website.pdf
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size. For similar reason, we are unable to exploit changes in the magnitude of radon risk in affected
houses to understand how households react to changes in risk more generally.
We also provide new evidence on how the housing market reacts to information about environmen-
tal risks. We show that mandatory information provision has a strong effect on household choices and
that, at least in the case of radon, prices react to the information about the risk even when the actual
level of risk is the same.
Overall, our analysis highlights the importance of considering the extent and distribution of indoor
air pollution costs alongside those of ambient air pollutants. Given the significant amount of time that
we spend indoors, and the relatively little policy and research attention to this subject, we argue that
much more focus should be directed towards this issue in future work.
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8 Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Radon Maps
Notes: The maps give the level of radon risk from 1 to 5 in the first map and from 1 to 6 in the other two with darker blue corresponding to higher
levels of radon.
Figure 2: The graphical representation of the probability of transacting a house with (right) and
without (left) radon.
Notes: λ: difference between the seller and buyer valuation. G(.): distribution of λ. ϕ difference between the valuation of the highest-bidding buyer
and the average buyer for a radon-affected house, λr = λ+ϕ. Probability to the right of zero gives the probability of a transaction. We are agnostic
about what is the value of E(λ) is, but based on our later results we present a case where E(λ) < 0, E(λ + ϕ) < 0, and E(ϕ) > 0.
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Table 1: Summary statistics: Repeated transactions with changing radon levels.
Radon 2nd sale
Radon 1st sale 1(Radon-Free) 2 3 4 5 6 Total
1(Radon-Free) 1,099,211 81,876 12,770 8,913 3,772 440 1,206,982
2 19,855 88,180 5,912 5,909 4,287 451 124,594
3 1,823 2,142 17,794 2,457 2,702 611 27,529
4 602 401 401 11,582 3,415 1,054 17,455
5 140 184 128 664 14,145 3,566 18,827
6 0 1 0 2 149 3,391 3,543
Total 1,121,631 172,784 37,005 29,527 28,470 9,513 1,398,930
Notes: the table gives the number of repeated transactions for the estimation period which means that only first transactions after
2002 and second transactions before 2012 are included. The total number of transactions is around 2.8m. Data on transactions comes
from Land Registry and on radon levels from PHE.
Table 2: Summary statistics: Average prices of house prices and changes in radon.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Radon=1 Radon>1 ∆radon=0 ∆radon>0 ∆radon<0
Price Mean 202,132 194,895
St. Dev. 197,498 166,836
Change in price Mean 34,788 28,731 21,692
St. Dev. 92,006 71,656 65,990
N 6,482,879 2,208,866 1,234,303 254,016 26,492
Notes: the table gives the number of individual transactions in columns 1-2 and repeated transactions in columns 3-5. The data is
the estimation period which means that only first transactions after 2002 and second transactions before 2012 are included. Data on
transactions comes from Land Registry and on radon levels from PHE.
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Table 3: Balancing tests: Output Area characteristics and changes in radon
(from 1 to any other category).
(1) (2) (3)
Outcome variable (share of): Coefficient S.E. R2
Students 0.000 0.0002 0.058
People in employment 0.000 0.0027 0.128
Higher social status -0.007 0.0049 0.22
People with university degrees -0.0109*** 0.0035 0.263
People living alone 0.001 0.0006 0.064
Owner occupiers (outright or mortgage) 0.0023 0.0078 0.099
People living in social housing 0.0109 0.0075 0.076
House outright owners -0.0001 0.0043 0.108
Households with children 0.0018 0.0016 0.034
People in their 30’s -0.0018 0.0012 0.135
Mid-aged people 0.0021 0.0013 0.094
People in their 60’s 0.0033 0.0022 0.107
Households who moved into the area from far -0.2651 0.1774 0.044
Households who moved within the area 0.0029 0.01 0.026
Houses with the lowest floor - basement -0.0956 0.1943 0.153
Houses with the lowest floor - ground 0.8442 0.6005 0.291
Houses with the lowest floor - first -0.7026 0.4387 0.281
People working in health services 0.1362 0.0981 0.156
People reported not to be in good health -0.0015 0.0013 0.157
People who work from home -0.0002 0.0009 0.093
People who work within 2km of the house 0.0018 0.0034 0.161
Houses with 4 or more rooms 0.0007 0.0031 0.072
Notes: Each row gives the results of a pairwise regression with the area characteristic as the LHS variable and
change in radon at OA level on the RHS. Regressions include TTWA fixed effects. The sample size is 85515 for all
regressions and the data is based on Output Areas from the 2001 census. All variables are shares. The independent
variable is a dummy that equals one if the maximum level of radon changed from 1 to any other category. Only
places with the 1km grid are included. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 4: The Effect of Radon Risk on House Prices with TTWA trends.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
X={2} X={2,3} X={2,3,4} X={2,3,4,5} X={2,3,4,5,6}
Panel A: 1 → X -0.0164+ -0.0140+ -0.0137+ -0.0133+ -0.0133+
(0.00291) (0.00281) (0.00261) (0.00258) (0.00257)
N 496115 508891 517820 521586 522026
R2 0.235 0.236 0.236 0.237 0.237
Panel B: X → 1 -0.00442 -0.00407 -0.00363 -0.00365 -0.00365
(0.00377) (0.00331) (0.00326) (0.00326) (0.00326)
N 35789 39036 40325 43373 44374
R2 0.291 0.302 0.305 0.306 0.307
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, cluster on 1km grid and year * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, †p < 0.001. All
regressions include interactions of time controls with TTWA controls. Panel A tests for upwards risk moves, using samples
composed of sales that stay in category 1 and homes that move from category 1 to other categories. In column 1, we examine
moves from category 1 to the lowest category classified as affected by radon (category 2). Columns (2)-(5) progressively expand
the sample to include homes that start in category 1 but move to higher risk categories. Panel B repeats the same process for
downwards risk moves.
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Table 5: The Effect of Radon Risk on House Prices with local area (OA) trends.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
X={2} X={2,3} X={2,3,4} X={2,3,4,5} X={2,3,4,5,6}
Panel A: 1 → X -0.0216*** -0.0198*** -0.0167** -0.0170** -0.0167**
(0.00744) (0.00661) (0.00680) (0.00686) (0.00691)
N 129397 132654 134881 135909 136040
R2 0.704 0.703 0.704 0.704 0.704
Panel B: X → 1 -0.0138 -0.0113 -0.0113 -0.0106 -0.00365
(0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.00326)
N 9228 10037 10268 10950 44374
R2 0.669 0.673 0.671 0.669 0.307
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, cluster on 1km grid and year * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, †p < 0.001. Panel A
tests for upwards risk moves, using samples composed of sales that stay in category 1 and homes that move from category 1 to
other categories. In column 1, we examine moves from category 1 to the lowest category classified as affected by radon (category
2). Columns (2)-(5) progressively expand the sample to include homes that start in category 1 but move to higher risk categories.
Panel B repeats the same process for downwards risk moves. All regressions include OA fixed effects interacted with time trends.
Table 6: The Asymmetric Effect of Radon Risk on House Prices.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Starting Cat: Cat 1 Cat 2,3 Cat 4,5,6 Cat 1 Cat 2,3 Cat 4,5,6
Up -0.0133+ -0.00398 -0.00675 -0.0164+ -0.0103** -0.00601
(0.00257) (0.00355) (0.00586) (0.00291) (0.00393) (0.00655)
Down 0 -0.00572 -0.00341 0 -0.00441 -0.00289
(.) (0.00333) (0.00806) (.) (0.00365) (0.0120)
N 522026 63571 14143 496115 47776 11637
R2 0.237 0.289 0.295 0.235 0.298 0.304
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, cluster on MSOA and year * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, †p < 0.001. All
regressions include years of sale dummies (years) interacted with TTWA effects. Columns 1-3 include regressions where the
move can be by any number of categories. Columns 4-6 give results only for moves by one category.
Table 7: The Effect of OA Radon Risk Level on the Number of Transac-
tions (panel of OA averages).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(trans) ln(trans) ln(trans) ln(trans) ln(price)
∆Radonrt 0.0100+
(0.00291)
1 → Any 0.0114*** 0.0116*** -0.0121+
(0.00436) (0.00437) (0.00255)
Any → 1 0.00364 0.00624 -0.00235
(0.0104) (0.0105) (0.00446)
N 335826 335826 335826 335826 335826
R2 0.733 0.733 0.733 0.733 0.954
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the OA level included in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01, †p < 0.001. ∆Radonrt gives changes in a categorical variable which takes values from 1 to
6. 1 → Any denotes a dummy for all properties/areas that start in category one but finish in any other
category. Any → 1 denotes the reverse. All regressions include an OA fixed effect and a TTWA fixed effect
interacted with the time trend.
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Table 8: The Effect of OA Radon Risk Level on Sorting: changes in OA population
shares and changes in radon from 1 to any other category.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Degree Social Status Outright Owner Occupier Income
1 → Any -0.0330+ -0.0301+ -0.00432*** -0.0208*** -0.00373+
(0.00508) (0.00594) (0.00140) (0.00664) (0.000762)
Any → 1 -0.0166 -0.0213 -0.00586 -0.0302 -0.00198
(0.0144) (0.0169) (0.00398) (0.0189) (0.00217)
N 40836 40836 40836 40836 40877
R2 0.016 0.019 0.040 0.026 0.302
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the MSOA level included in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01,
†p < 0.001. The results are based on a cross sectional regression of changes in OA radon from one to any other
category with the baseline staying in category 1 using the 2007 map change. The dependent variable is the change in
the share of the OA between 2001 and 2011 Censuses. All regressions include a TTWA FE.
Table 9: Robustness of the Effect of Radon Risk on House Prices - placebo and areas with no
tests.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ln(price) ∆ln(price) ∆ln(price) ∆ln(price) ∆ln(price) ∆ln(price)
1 → Any 0.000599 0.00303
(placebo) (0.00135) (0.00669)
Any → 1 -0.00352 -0.00114
(placebo) (0.00211) (0.0120)
1 → Any -0.0185** -0.0184+
(non tested) (0.00746) (0.00302)
Area Trend TTWA TTWA OA OA OA TTWA
N 1445262 1445262 342311 342311 124138 474679
R2 0.283 0.283 0.707 0.707 0.706 0.236
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the 1km gird and year included in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, †p < 0.001.
The results in columns 1-4 are based on pairs of transactions that occurred after 2010 (using the same map). The placebo change in radon
applied to those pairs is based on the change the house experienced when maps changed between 2003 and 2007. It is a falsification test.
The dependent variable is price so that the results are equivalent to tables 4 and 5. 1 → Any denotes a dummy for all properties/areas that
start in category one but finish in any other category. Any → 1 denotes the reverse. Columns 5 and 6 give results of a reclassification from




Table A1: Correlation between ambient air pollution (PM10) and radon
risk.
(1) (2) (3)
PM10 2003 PM10 2008 Change in PM10
OA radon 2003 0.00233
(0.00563)
OA radon 2008 0.00284
(0.00286)
Change in OA radon 0.00502
(0.00543)
N 153640 153578 153578
R2 0.992 0.993 0.991
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, cluster on MSOA and year * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01,
†p < 0.001. All regressions inlcude an MSOA fixed effect. OA radon measures are maximum values in the
area. PM10 concentration is based on air pollution readings from the three closest DEFRA monitoring
stations (weighted by inverse squared distance). Change in PM10 refers to the change in levels between
2008 and 2003.




1 → Any 50m grid -0.0224* -0.0214**
(0.0126) (0.00974)
1 → Any 1km grid -0.0214** -0.00272 -0.00221
(0.00977) (0.0149) (0.0148)
Sample FULL 50m grid only 50m grid only
Observations 129176 28345 28345
R2 0.704 0.692 0.692
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, cluster on grid squares * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01,
†p < 0.001. All regressions include an OA fixed effects interacted with time trends. Column 1
compares the impact of radon depending on whether the best available information comes from the
50m grid or the 1km grid. Column 2 shows the impact of the 1km grid information in a sample
where 50m grid data is available. Column 3 shows the impact of 50m grid information and 1km grid
information in locations where 50m grid information is available.
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Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, + p < 0.001
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, cluster on 1km grid and year * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, †p < 0.001. Column 1 includes OA fixed effects
interacted with time trends while column 2 is based on TTWA fixed effects.
Mortgage denotes a dummy variable that equals one if the transaction is
funded by a mortgage from Nationwide. 1 → Any with Mortgage is a dummy
variable that equals one if the transaction is funded by a Nationwide mortgage
and receives the treatment.
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